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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN E. MAXFIELD, as Guardian
ad Litem for LAURIE ANN MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and Appellant, I Case No.
vs.

|

13955

KENNETH 0. FISHLER,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff for special and general damages resulting from the Defendant's negligence
in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as a
Medical Doctor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court granted Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the action for failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute
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the action. Said Motion was granted at the time of trial
when the Plaintiff's parents and attorney were present
and ready to proceed with trial. The Court further denied the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. From the
Orders of the Court granting the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for failure to prosecute and denying Plaintiff's
Motion for a New Trial the Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests this Court reverse the Order of
the trial court and grant the Plaintiff an opportunity
to have her case heard on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff, LAURIE ANN MAXFIELD was born
December 10, 1967 in Salt Lake City, Utah and was
attended and treated by the Defendant as her physician
for approximately three years after her birth (R-110).
At the time of the Plaintiff's birth the Defendant examined the Plaintiff and in his report indicated, according to the hospital records signed by the Defendant, that
the Plaintiff was normal in all respects and so indicated
specifically in regards to the infant's genitalia (R-28).
The Defendant examined the infant not only at birth
but many times over a three year period as her pediatrician (R-110). The defect was observable through
external physical examination (R-110) (R-21). From
birth until the time of corrective surgery, performed on
or about October 22, 1970, Defendant failed to observe
or recommend surgery to correct a constant wetting situ-
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ation with the child. On October 22, 1970 surgery was
performed by Dr. P. Clark to correct this problem (R-21).
Urinary problems continued and the Plaintiff was admitted to St. Joseph Hospital and Medical Center in
Phoenix, Arizona and on April 17, 1972, Dr. Moberly performed an aptoscopy and urethral dialation in hopes of
discovering the cause of the lower urinary irritation (R58). At the time of this examination the Doctor discovered that surgery had corrected the external problems
but there continued to exist a hypoplastic condition of
the ureteral orifices (R-60). As a result of the belated
discovery of the need for surgery the Plaintiff suffered
a great deal of pain and inconvenience for the first three
years of her life and in addition her hypoplastic urethral
condition continues to this day causing a recurrent urinary infection with accompanying irritative symptoms
(R-37).
Shortly after the Plaintiff's parents sought the counsel of their attorney the Plaintiff and her family moved
to Phoenix, Arizona (R-18). After moving to Phoenix,
Arizona, their home was flooded and many of their records were lost and destroyed (R-18). As a result of this
condition and many others (R-19) there was some delay
between the time of the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint
and delay in answering certain discovery of the Defendants and in the prosecution of Plaintiff's discovery. However, the cause was set for trial on October 29, 1974. The
Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Boyd M. Fullmer, who was present in court and her parents, Susan E.
Maxfield and Steven K. Maxfield were present in court.
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(R-13). The Plaintiff moved for a continuance to allow
the presence of a witness, Dr. Clark, which Motion for
Continuance was denied (R-15). The Plaintiff moved
the Court for leave to add the child's parents as parties
Plaintiff, which Motion was denied (R-15). The Defendant then moved for an Order of Dismissal for failure to
prosecute this action under the provisions of Rule 41 (b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court
granted said Motion (R-15). The Plaintiff was represented at the time of the trial by her attorney and her
mother and father were present and in court prepared
to testify. The Defendant was also present and was
capable of being called as an adverse and hostile witness
(R-18). Without giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to
proceed with trial, when the trial was set and the jury
called, the Court granted the Motion of the Defendant
to dismiss for want of prosecution (R-13).
On the 11th day of November, 1974 the Defendant
moved for a new trial on the ground that the Court had
erred in failing to allow the Plaintiff to proceed with trial
when the Plaintiff's parents and attorney were present
and ready to proceed (R-16). The Court heard argument
of Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial on the 12th day of
December, 1974, and found that the Court had not abused
its discretion in entering its Order of Dismissal (R-5)
and the Court entered its written Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial on the 19th day of December,
1974 (R-5). From the above Orders of the Court the Defendant entered its Notice of Appeal on the 31st day of
December, 1974 (R-3).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
In its Order of Dismissal entered October 29th, 1974
the Court ordered "that Defendant's Motion for an Order of Dismissal for failure to prosecute this action under
the provisions of Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be and the same is hereby granted and this action
is dismissed (R-15)." Unless the Court otherwise specifies, except where dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or lack of indispensable party, dismissal
under Rule 41 (b) operates as an adjudication on the
merits.
*
In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 41 (b), the
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff. In the case of Martin v. Stevens, 121
Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 (1952), the Court stated,
In appraising the dismissal which was granted
against the Plaintiff, he is entitled to have us review all of the evidence together with every logical inference which may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
This rule was reaffirmed in Evans v. Butters, 16 Utah
2d 272, 399 P. 2d 210 (1965), wherein the Count, citing
the Martin case supra, said, "Wherever there is conflict
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we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff."
It is the well established policy of the Courts to
allow a party to have his day in court whenever possible.
The principal object desired in all cases is the searching
out of the truth and doing justice between the parties.
To carry out that purpose it is the policy of the law to
favor a trial on the merits and to afford both parties a
full opportunity to present their evidence to the best of
their ability so that the controversy may be disposed of
on a substantial rather than technical ground. In the
case of McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc.,
17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966), the Court set forth
the above general policy of the law and then went on to
say,
In order to achieve the objectives just stated, it
is sometimes necessary to look beyond what may
appear to be ill-advised, or even irritating and
contemptuous conduct of counsel to the adjudication of the rights of the parties to the action.
It should be kept in mind that their rights and
any such misconduct of counsel are separate and
distinct things which should be dealt with separately.
The case of Bunting Tractor Co., Inc. v. Emmett
D. Ford Contractors, Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P„ 2d 191
(1954), involved a dismissal under Rule 41 (b) because
of Plaintiff's failure to file a non-resident cost bond
within one month after demand as required by Rule
12 (k). The Supreme Court held that the dismissal with
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prejudice was an abuse of discretion and modified the
dismissal to be without prejudice. The Court based its
modifications on two factors: (1) The dismissal was based
on actions by Plaintiff which were technical and did not
go to the merits of the case. (2) The bond was posted
after the 30-day limit but before Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, so that Defendant suffered no harm. Because
of these factors, the Court felt that the dismissal with
prejudice was inconsistent with the philosophy behind
the Rules of Civil Procedure. That philosophy was
stated thusly by the Court:
The general philosophy of the new Rules of
Civil Procedure is that liberality should be indulged to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. (Footnote to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1(a)). In construing and applying these rules it should be the
purpose of the Courts to afford litigants every
reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits
of their cases. This policy is not an innovation
to our law. It has long been embodied both in
the statutes and decisions that deviation from
form and procedure shall not work a forfeiture
of substantive rights in the absence of prejudice
to the opposing party.
To have allowed the parties to proceed with the trial
would not have been prejudicial to the Defendant.
The Federal Courts have also construed Rule 41 (b)
in favor of giving a litigant his day in Court. In Davis
v. Operation Amigo, Inc., 378 F. 2d 101 (10th Cir., 1967),
a dismissal for failure to prosecute was reversed where
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it occurred less than four months from the date the case
was filed. In making its reversal, the Court noted the
general rule that the exercise of the power to dismiss
by the trial judge is discretionary and should be sustained upon appeal in the absence of abuse. However,
dismissal is a harsh sanction and should be resorted to
only in extreme cases. The judge must be ever mindful
that the policy of the law favors the hearing of the litigant's claim upon the merits. These policies were also
substantiated in the case of Meeker v. Rizley, 325 F. 2d
269 (10th Cir., 1963).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has given a list
of factors which should be considered in a dismissal for
failure to prosecute. These factors are set out in the case
of States Steamship Co. v. Philippine Airlines, 426 F. 2d
803 (9th Cir., 1970), which said the following factors
should be weighed:
1)

The Plaintiff's right to a hearing on the claim.

2) The impairment of the Defendant's defenses
which is presumed from the unreasonable delay.
3) The wholesome policy of the law in favor of the
prompt disposition of law suits.
4) The duty of the Plaintiff to proceed with due
diligence.
Based upon the policy of giving a party his day in
court and weighing the four factors mentioned above, it
would appear that the dismissal in this case was too harsh
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a sanction under the circumstances and amounted to an
abuse of discretion.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROCEED WITH TRIAL.
Although the Plaintiff would have preferred to have
the trial continued, both Mr. and Mrs. Maxfield and their
counsel were present in Court and ready to proceed. Instead of allowing them to proceed after the denial of the
Motion for Continuance the action was dismissed for
failure to prosecute. Nowhere in its search for authority
on this point can counsel for the Appellant find authority to uphold a dismissal in these circumstances.
There are two types of cases which must be distinguished from the case at hand. (1) In many states
the rules of civil procedure provide that a case will be
dismissed for failure to prosecute if it is not brought to
trial within a certain time period, usually within two
years after the filing of the complaint. There are cases
in which the Plaintiff and his counsel were in court and
ready to proceed yet a dismissal for failure to prosecute
was upheld because the time limit for bringing the action
provided in the rules or by statute had lapsed. These
cases, of which there are several, are obviously distinguishable from the case at hand. (2) Another type of case
in which dismissal has been upheld, even though plaintiff and his counsel were in court and ready to proceed,
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is in the situation where the plaintiff did not give notice
of his readiness for trial until after he had been served
with a notice of the Motion for Dismissal. Again, this
is distinguishable from the case at hand where plaintiff
was present in court with jurors and the officers of the
court ready to proceed before the Motion for Dismissal
was made.
Since the adoption of the current Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, after which Utah's Rule 41 (b)
is patterned, there has been no federal case upholding
a dismissal for failure to prosecute where the plaintiff
and his counsel were present in court and ready to proceed with the trial. Since 1916, no state cases could be
found upholding such a dismissal in this situation. There
are no Utah cases upholding it.
There are several cases in state courts which have
held that a dismissal in these circumstances is improper.
Because the injustice of such a dismissal is so obvious,
most of the cases are brief per curiam opinions.
The case of Rios v. New York City Transit Authority, 35 A. D. 2d 804, 315 N. Y. S. 2d 730 (1970), is typical of such cases. When that case was called on the calendar by the trial court, plaintiff's attorney submitted
an affidavit of actual engagement of trial counsel and
requested an adjournment which was denied. Counsel
then requested the case be marked either ready subject
to trial counsel's engagement or ready for trial. The trial
court instead dismissed the action. The appellate court
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vacated the dismissal in a per curiam opinion and ruled
that it was an improvident exercise of discretion.
In the case of Stanley v. Pryde W. Basinger & Co.,
265 N. C. 718,144 S. E. 2d 861 (1965), the case was tried
but the verdict was set aside as against the weight of
the evidence on May 18, 1961. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant took any action to move the case to trial and
it was eventually placed on a "clean-up calendar" in
March, 1965. Upon notice of this action, the Defendant
requested that the case be dismissed upon its call on the
clean-up calendar. The case was called on March 18,
1965r and the Plaintiff and his counsel were present and
ready to proceed. Upon inquiry by the Court as to why
the case had not been tried, Plaintiff's counsel replied
that "there had not been much involved and nobody
pushed it." The case was thereupon nonsuited for failure
to prosecute. The ruling was reversed in a brief per
curiam opinion which explained that if the plaintiff had
failed to appear or refused to proceed when so ordered,
the Court would have inherent power to dismiss the action. But when the plaintiff was present and ready for
trial when his case was called, the judge was without
authority to dismiss the action.
The case of Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., 188
A. 2d 510 (Del., 1963), expanded this concept by the
Court ruling that an action should not be dismissed
where it is being diligently prosecuted, even though its
prosecution has been neglected at a prior time. The complaint in the Ayers case was filed February 2, 1951, and
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Plaintiff filed a stipulation extending, without termination date, the time in which Defendant was required to
answer the complaint. Plaintiff served notice of a Motion for Entry of Judgment by Default for failure to
plead or otherwise answer on June 26, 1960. Prior to
that time, neither party had taken any action on the
matter. On July 22, 1960, the Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41 (b). The
Court held that a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute will not be granted if the Plaintiff is diligently prosecuting his claim even though at some prior time he has
been guilty of gross negligence. Plaintiff's filing of the
Motion for Default Judgment prior to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss constituted diligent prosecution of his
claim. If this action was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of diligent prosecution, surely being present in
court and ready to proceed with trial at the appointed
time meets this requirement and precludes dismissal
under this rule.
It has even been held that it is not necessary for
Plaintiff to be present at time of trial but only has counsel in order to preclude a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In a syllabus opinion in Franks v. Reid, 128 Ga.
App. 454, 197 S. E. 2d 156 (Ct. of App,, 1973), the Court
held that where counsel for Plaintiff announced he was
ready for trial, it was error for the trial court to dismiss
the action for want of prosecuition based on the fact that
the Plaintiff himself was not present.
When coupled with the well established policy of the
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Utah courts to give a litigant his day in court whenever
possible, these cases provide a clear indication that the
dismissal in the present case when the parties were present in court and ready to proceed, the jury had been
called and the Court was scheduled to hear the case, is
contrary to the purposes of Rule 41 (b) and totally contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure as they work an
injustice upon the parties.
CONCLUSION
This case constitutes a clear and absolute abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court. Under present
day rules it seems incomprehensible that a Court would
not allow the parties to proceed with the trial of their
case.
The Court should therefore reverse the District
Court's Order and allow the parties to try the case upon
its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
FULLMER & HARDING
540 East Fifth South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Appellant
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